This paper presents a health monitoring approach for Electro-Mechanical Actuators (EMA). We define four different indicators to continuously evaluate the health state of the system. The four indicators are computed by leveraging the output from a Statistical Process Monitoring (SPM) method based on multivariate statistics, such as the Hotelling's T 2 statistic and the Q statistic. SPM approaches give a dichotomous answer, i.e. the presence/absence of a fault. In this work, we propose four ways to compute a continuous indicator starting from the discrete SPM output, that is better suited for health monitoring. We test the approach using a dataset collected from a large experimental campaign on a 1:1 scale EMA for primary flight controls of small aircrafts, that led to EMA failure. Results show the effectiveness of the method.
I. INTRODUCTION
The More/All Electric Aircraft (MEA/AEA) initiative is a technological trend aiming to increase the adoption of electrical actuation systems in the aerospace field [1] , [2] . In this context, we talk about Power-By-Wire (PBW) technology, referring to the elimination of the hydraulic transmission in flight control actuation systems (see Fig. 1 ).
Traditional actuation equipment on aircrafts rely on hydraulic systems [3] . In PBW actuation, instead, hydraulic pipelines are replaced by electrical wires. PBW actuators benefit aircrafts actuation systems with a series of advantages. These include the reduction of hydraulic fluids, weight savings and improved energy efficiency [1] , [4] , [5] . PBW solutions consist of: (i) Electro-HydroStatic Actuators (EHSAs) [6] and (ii) Electro-Mechanical Actuators (EMAs) [4] , see Fig. 2 .
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Kan Liu . Several research programs have been launched in order to investigate the advantages of electro-mechanical actuation systems in aerospace. Some of these, focused on primary controls, include (in chronological order): the Advanced Electromechanical Actuation System (EMAS) [7] , the Electrically Powered Actuation Design (EPAD) [8] , the Power Optimised Aircraft (POA)-FP5 [9] , the More Open Electrical Technologies (MOET)-FP6 [10] , the flight control with distributed intelligence and systems integration (COVADIS) [11] , and the ACTUATION2015-FP7 [12] projects. Research on secondary control actuation has been faced, as illustrative example, in the Distributed Electrically Actuated Wing System (DEAWS) project [13] .
After these researches, EMAs started to be deployed to in-service aircrafts [2] . For instance, EMAs are used for landing gear braking, mid spoiler surfaces and trimmable horizontal stabilizer on Boeing 787 [14] . On Airbus A380, EHSAs are employed for ailerons and elevators, while EMAs are utilized for slats, trimmable horizontal stabilizer and thrust reverser actuation [15] . Electro-mechanical actuators are employed also for the following applications: propeller brake system (Airbus A400M), cart lift system (Boeing 747-8, Boeing 777-300), and pedestal radar actuation (Agusta NH-90).
Nevertheless, compared to hydraulic actuators or EHSAs, technological barriers remain for a wide adoption of EMAs, especially considering these issues:
• It is difficult to provide space for EMAs on thin wings of small aircrafts, i.e. maximum gross takeoff weight of 5.670 kg (12.500 lb) or less [16] .
• The use of EMAs for flight control surfaces requires an optimisation effort in terms of materials, sensors, heat dissipation and electrical distribution [17] , [18] .
• Mechanical jams cannot be tolerated in flight-critical applications. The last point raised a critical issue. The lack of accumulated knowledge and experience regarding reliability, and the risk of failure due to jamming of the mechanical transmission (usually a ballscrew), drove significant research efforts towards the development of Fault Diagnosis (FD) and Health Monitoring (HM) algorithms for EMAs in aerospace.
This paper presents a part of the results of the Reliable Electromechanical actuator for PRImary SurfacE with health monitoring (REPRISE) initiative, a EU-H2020 funded project that aims at introducing HM algorithms for primary flight control surfaces EMAs in small aircrafts (aileron, elevator and rudder) [19] . The scope of the REPRISE project is to support the improvement of the Technological Readiness Level (TRL) for a EMA-based flight control system of small aircrafts bringing it to TRL 5. The goal of the project will be achieved by: 1) Developing a Health Monitoring system (Phase 1). 2) Design a new electro-mechanical actuator architecture (Phase 2).
This paper is focused on the results of the first activity (Phase 1). It entails the following aspects:
• Perform an endurance test campaign with a test rig specifically developed for the project.
• Develop a HM system able to detect degradations of the mechanical components (mainly the ballscrew transmission) before they will evolve into failures.
The need for a HM algorithm for flight EMAs is well motivated by previous substantial research efforts [20] . The Health On Line Monitoring for Electro-mechanical actuator Safety (HOLMES)-FP7 project [21] focused on developing fault detection and isolation (FDI) methods for EMAs mechanical components such as ballscrew transmission [22] - [25] . In the same way, the NASA funded several activities on fault diagnosis in aerospace using a flyable test-bed [26] , [27] . A hybrid method, combining a signal-based and a knowledge-based method, based on machine learning classifiers, was proposed in [28] . Authors in [29] proposed a HM method for EMAs based on position predictive models. A model-based prognostic method for the freeplay identification in flight EMAs has been devised in [30] . Fault detection in aerospace EMAs for unmanned aerial system flight controls was proposed in [31] . Vibration symptoms of jam and metal flaking in the actuator ballscrew mechanism have been considered in [27] . Authors in [32] defined the structure that a knowledge-based approach to aerospace health monitoring, using expert systems, should have. Monitoring methods have been developed also for aircrafts hydraulic systems, see [33] .
The goal of this paper is to use Statistical Process Monitoring (SPM) methods for Health Monitoring of EMAs.
SPM is used to perform Fault Diagnosis (FD) by applying multivariate statistics to industrial process data [34] . Typically, the Hotelling's T 2 statistic and the Q-statistic, also known as the Squared Prediction Error (SPE), are used for the detection of an out-of-control situation [35] , [36] . Extension of the basic fault detection mechanism, like contribution and reconstruction plots, have been devised to accomplish also fault isolation and fault identification [34] , [37] . However, fault diagnosis methods based on SPM look for a dichotomous answer, i.e. if there is an abnormal situation or not. This answer is not suited for health monitoring, since we need indicators that continuously evaluate the general health state of the system. So, in this paper, we present a general Health Monitoring approach for Electro-Mechanical Actuators based on Statistical Process Control methods. The focus of the monitoring is on the mechanical transmission components, in particular, in the REPRISE project actuator, the ballscrew and nut assembly. The choice of using SPM methods over model-based approaches is due to the following facts:
• The design effort of HM indicators is lower for SPM approaches.
• Ability to capture the high-level, overall health state of the selected components, as opposed to focusing on their detailed behaviour.
• Difficulty to develop an adequate model of the system due to the limited number of measurable variables. This paper presents the results of the first activity of the REPRISE project. The contributions are:
• To devise a methodology to generate a set of Health Monitoring indicators from the results of the SPM methods. As far as we are aware, this is the first time that such approach is proposed in literature.
• For HM, we employ only standard measurements (no additional sensors are used). In particular, we rely only on the EMA motor phase currents.
• The proposed method is general and applicable to different types of electro-mechanical actuators (also not in aerospace applications).
• We propose a preflight test strategy that employs the devised monitoring solution.
• We tested the method on a large dataset, collected from a 1:1 scale EMA for primary actuation of small aircrafts.
To do this, we performed an extensive experimental activity, monitoring the actuator continuously. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In section II, we show the results of a Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) on the tested EMA. Section III describes the experimental setup and the undergone test procedure. Section IV shows the results of visual inspections on the mechanical components of the EMA, i.e. the ballscrew. Section V describes the proposed general methodology, developing the health monitoring indicators. Section VI applies the method to the specific flight EMA. Finally, Section VII is devoted to conclusions and suggestions for future work. generally reckoned from engine starting to shut-down. Inspection Visual verification that the equipment as manufactured conforms to the design documentation. Preflight Test A test that is administered on the ground and before every mission for the purpose of detecting latent failures
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURES
This section presents the reliability analysis performed in order to guide the experimental procedure design. Specifically, Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was performed to identify the actuator failure modes and their occurrence likelihood during a given mission profile. Then, exploiting the FMECA results, a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was performed to check if the existing actuator is compliant to the safety requirements.
A. FAILURE MODE EFFECT AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
The EMA used in this work consists of: (i) a BrushLess DC (BLDC) motor; (ii) a direct-drive nut-ballscrew transmission; (iii) an Electronic Control Unit (ECU), see Fig. 3 . This assembly was subject to a Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), evaluating the failure mode rates of each single component according to the MIL-HDBK-217F handbook [38] , over the mission profile reported in Table 1 . The duration of the mission was one million of flight hours and the FMECA identified a total of 1950 different failure modes. Table 2 shows the resulting Failure Mode Effect Summary (FMES): this table presents a summary of the identified equivalent failure modes rates, expressed as failures per million flight hours (fpmh). FMES results show that the majority of component failures do not compromise the overall system functionality. The results in Table 2 are then used as input to a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), that will be used to test the compliance of the considered EMA with the safety requirements defined by the project specifications. For instance, the safety requirement on ''Actuator runaway'' in Table 3 depends on failure modes related to the static brake and loss of actuator reported in Table 2 . 
B. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
The fault tree analysis was performed to identify if the actuator is compliant to predefined safety requirements. FTA assessed four fundamental failure modes with their risk likelihood: 
1) Actuator loss of control/function: the actuator is lost
and cannot be controlled anymore. This event has been evaluated considering the combination in OR of all the failures leading to ''Loss of Actuator''. In particular, according to Table 2 , the following failure mode end effects have been considered as causes for this event: a) Loss of actuator. b) Static brake always engaged. c) Possible loss of actuator. 2) Actuator free floating: the actuator results in free floating or excessive backlash, due to structural failures (e.g. the actuator is mechanically detached from the surface it controls). This is caused by breakage of physical structures. 3) Actuator runaway: the actuator results in free floating, hardover (deflection to an extreme position), uncommanded movements or oscillations, due to a failure in the actuator brake or erroneous readings from the motor position sensor. This event has been evaluated considering the following cases: a) The actuator has lost its functionality and it cannot be braked. b) The actuator makes a mistake in the evaluation of its position and moves in an incorrect position. In particular, case 3a has been considered as the combination in AND of: (i) actuator Loss of Control/Function and (ii) the actuator cannot be braked due to a failure of the brake assy or the loss of capability to command the actuator brake. 4) Actuator jam: there is a failure in the mechanisms related to the movement of the actuator, leading to actuator jamming. The considered components are the ballscrew, the nut and the bearings in the actuator assembly. Table 3 shows the FTA results. The considered operational time for FTA is of 1 Flight Hour (FH). As can be noticed, the safety requirements for failures 1) and 4) are not satisfied for the considered actuator.
As a result of Table 3 , we want to focus on failures with a risk likelihood higher than required by specifications. The actuator loss of control/function and jam failures can derive mainly from binding or breakage of the mechanical transmission, i.e. the ballscrew. One of the most plausible causes of the ballscrew damaging is the dwindling or contamination of the lubricant inside the ballscrew/nut assembly. Also, notice that, while possible during the operating life of the EMA, the lack of lubricant is more plausibly due to a maintenance error. So, the experimental conditions were designed in order to evaluate the requirements not satisfied in Table 3 (see Section III-B).
The experimental activity, described in the following Section III, is specifically conceived to collect data for developing the monitoring algorithms with specific attention to the critical failures of the ballscrew/nut assembly, as evidenced above.
C. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
In order to design the experimental activity for the realization of the Health Monitoring algorithm, it is of paramount importance to know the performance requirements that the available EMA has been designed to fulfil, so that it will be possible to perform tests which can bring to system degradation (in addition to evaluate its current health status). The considered EMA has been designed according to specifications about:
(i) dynamic properties of the control system (i.e. closed loop bandwidth and tracking error), not reported for confidentiality reasons, but considered in the design of experiments; (ii) physical characteristics of the assembly (i.e. mass, overall dimensions), also confidential but not limiting the design of experiments; (iii) nominal operating conditions: the EMA is also required to comply with predefined duty cycles for each of the actuated primary flight control (aileron, elevator, rudder).
Tables 4, 5, 6 show the duty cycles for the primary controls, where:
• Full range refers to the surface full deflection (Aileron: 20.5 mm, Elevator: 48.5 mm, Rudder: 47.4 mm);
• Max load is the largest rated axial load (Aileron: 1346 N, Elevator: 1405 N, Rudder: 1494 N). The EMA is required to tolerate a radial load up to 17% of the axial load; • The EMA has to be able to perform such duty cycles, with a sinusoidal position profile with amplitude given by the amplitude column of the Tables 4, 5 , 6, and a frequency between 0.2 Hz and 1 Hz.
From Tables 4, 5 , 6 it can be noticed that the most demanding condition is the rudder configuration (in terms of combined axial force and stroke). This worst-case configuration is taken as a guide for the experimental campaign design. It is also worth noting that the EMA, for the most time of its life, actuates a very little range (less than 1 mm) with a very small load (less than 150 N). So, the experiments will be designed taking into account this feature, but also considering that using sinusoidal profiles with higher amplitudes, i.e. 5 mm and 10 mm, will accelerate the test times leading to earlier observation of a degradation in the system. Experimental setup and performed tests will be described in the next section.
III. EXPERIMENTAL LAYOUT AND TESTING PROCEDURE DEFINITION
Following the results of the failure analysis of the previous section, there are two ways to increase the compliance to not satisfied requirements: (i) design an enhanced actuator (phase 2 of the REPRISE project); (ii) embed the EMA with a monitoring software that can assess the system state and prevent the appearance of a failure (phase 1 of the REPRISE project and focus of this paper). In order to design a HM algorithm, an extensive experimental activity has been devised with two main goals: (i) to induce accelerated degradation of the EMA, accordingly with the conclusions of the previous section; (ii) to periodically evaluate the EMA health status.
This section discusses the experimental activity carried out on the available EMA. The aim is to progressively lead the actuator to failure by means of an ''Endurance'' test activity. Data are collected to characterize the system and the degradation behaviour. In the following, we will describe: (i) the experimental setup and the measured variables; (ii) the chosen test procedure; (iii) a summary of the performed tests.
A. EXPERIMENTAL LAYOUT
The EMA is installed in a test bench suitably designed to provide the desired load and the actuator position reference trajectories, see Fig. 4 . The test rig is endowed with additional external sensors in order to monitor the system status.
1) EMA DESIGN
The EMA is composed by a BrushLess Direct Current (BLDC) electric motor, an Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and a ballscrew (see Section II-A and Fig. 3 ). The BLDC motor is a 3-phases Brushless DC motor with 5 poles. Two 28 Vdc power supplies are used to power a single DC bus, so that the actuator is able to operate even when one electric power supply is missing. The ECU also hosts current, speed and position closed-loop controllers. The position measure comes from three Hall sensors and an embedded LVDT transducer. The EMA can travel up to ±30 mm from its centered position (position offset equal to 0 mm). The ballscrew transmission consists of 8 circuits with 1 turn each and a specific number of balls per turn (not specified for confidential reasons). Moreover, in its standard operating conditions, the EMA is endowed with an anti-rotation device which is able to compensate small radial load components. We considered tests with and without this component.
2) LOAD GENERATION
The load on the actuator is generated by a Parker Ironcore R16-3A-HS linear motor controlled by a force closed-loop controller; this control loop uses a piezoelectric Kistler 9321BU load cell to feed back the measured load. The test bench has a Renishaw Resolute absolute optical encoder to measure the EMA absolute position; this sensor is used to evaluate the position controller performance and it is not used in the actuator position control system. Finally, three LEM ATO-20-B333-D10 sensors, that enclose the phase currents cables, are used to sense the 3 motor phase currents. This is necessary because the motor ECU cannot save the current internal measurements. Finally, the EMA is placed inside an air-cooled box to keep its temperature at standard room values.
3) CONTROL AND USER INTERFACES
The supervision and management software of the test bench is realized in National Instruments Labview and it is deployed on a National Instrument (NI) cRIO 9030. The cRIO generates the force and position reference signals. The cRIO uses the force measure fed back by the load cell to compute the load control command. This command is sent to the linear motor drive, that generates the control action to actuate the linear motor. The position control loop is managed by the ECU of the EMA, which gets the position reference from the cRIO and implements three cascaded control loops (position, speed and current). The software exposes a user interface where it is possible to insert the test parameters. Furthermore, it is also responsible for collecting measurements from the control chain. Finally, it is possible to configure the bench software to one of the aforementioned applicative settings, i.e. aileron, elevator and rudder. As said in Section II, we used the rudder configuration of the test rig to carry out the tests. It is worth noting that, in this configuration, the software is designed to provide only sinusoidal position reference trajectories. This follows from the specifications given in Table 6 .
The physical variables, collected by the cRIO described above and a NI cDAQ 9188, are: 1) Linear motor load reference. 2) Temperature inside the EMA box.
3) Current supplied to the EMA (from power supply) 4) Load cell measure. 5) EMA position reference. 6) EMA position measure from (embedded) LVDT sensor. 7) EMA position measure from (external) absolute optical sensor. 8) Current supplied to the linear motor (from its drive). 9) EMA 3-phase currents.
The data are sampled at 100 Hz, but for the phase currents (sampled at 4800 Hz). An example of measured data is shown in Fig. 5 .
B. TESTING PROCEDURE
As already said, the goal of the tests is twofold: (i) to stress the actuator with tests in operating conditions suitable to lead the ballscrew to mechanical degradation and, eventually, to jamming, while (ii) providing measurements useful to continuously monitor the health state of the ballscrew, using the proposed algorithm.
1) DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
In order to obtain the aforementioned goals, an alternation of two kinds of trials was used:
(i) Monitoring trials, designed to acquire the measurements necessary to evaluate the health status of the EMA. (ii) Endurance trials, designed to gradually deteriorate the ballscrew components by ''over-stressing'' them using suitable load and suitable reference trajectories.
These two kinds of tests alternate, providing both periodic continuous monitoring of the ballscrew conditions and worsening of the system conditions. Specifically, the Monitoring trials have been performed 16 times, from April 2017 to October 2017. Between two consecutive Monitoring trials, Endurance trials are performed. As specified above, in the rudder configuration, the EMA can be commanded only by sinusoidal position reference. So, an experiment is completely defined by the frequency, amplitude and offset of the position reference trajectory.
A total of 10 frequency values are used (in Hz):
{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 4}. This range was chosen according to the designed position tracking bandwidth of the EMA. For each frequency value, we tested the amplitude and offset values described in Table 7 . So, an experimental session consists of repeating the 6 test configurations of Table 7 for each of the 10 frequency values defined above. Usually, a Monitoring trial consists in executing one experimental session, while Endurance trials consist in repeating many successive identical experimental sessions. Notice that the EMA total stroke range during the tests is [−20, +20] mm. According to Table 6 this represents the stroke value of about the 99.9% of the total cycles.
The axial load conditions were chosen based on: (i) the requirements of Table 6 ; (ii) the pressure experienced by the balls in the ballscrew at those loads.
According to Table 6 , in the 99.6% of the total cycles the aerodynamical load is smaller than 373 N, which is about the 25% of the maximum rated load of 1494 N. For this reason, we used a load of 300 N as the nominal H0 load test condition.
2) EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
The experimental conditions have been defined to accelerate the system failure, i.e. the ballscrew/nut assembly degradation process. Specifically, the following actions have been undertaken:
• Employing 3 circuits out of 8 in the ballscrew. • Removing EMA anti-rotation device (after an initial test period).
• Radial load equal to 17% of axial load.
• Progressively remove lubricant in ballscrew/nut assembly. We employed only 3 circuits out of the 8, which is the design value. In this way, the load is sustained by a smaller number of balls. In addition, after the initial test phase, the anti-rotation device was removed. These expedients lead to a greater force acting on the balls and ballscrew tracks, creating an harsher condition for the EMA.
Also, we configured the bench such that a radial load, proportional to the axial load, is generated. Specifically, the radial load is 17% of the applied axial load, i.e. the maximum radial load imposed by the EMA design requirements.
Recall that, as discussed in section II, we want to focus on failures of the ballscrew and the main possible cause of degradation is the lack of lubricant. For this reason (and also to accelerate the EMA damaging) we tested the EMA in three different operating conditions: 1) Normal lubricant: standard level of lubricant.
2) Poor lubricant: lubricant partially removed (about half).
3) No lubricant: lubricant completely removed. In all the cases, the temperature of the test bench cabin, where the EMA resides, was kept approximately constant (at ambient temperature) by means of an air-cooling system (see Fig. 5 ). For each of the listed conditions, Monitoring and Endurance trials are performed as described in the next paragraphs.
3) FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS
A major factor for ballscrew deterioration is the force acting on the recirculating balls. In order to estimate this force, a Finite Element Method (FEM) analysis has been performed to assess at which load an overstressed condition of the ballscrew is present. We denote a condition as over-stressing if at least one ball is subject to a force greater than an assigned nominal value N 0 N (the value N 0 is not shown for confidential reasons). Otherwise, we say that the system is in a nominal load condition.
First of all, the FEM analysis was performed before the anti-rotation device removal in three load conditions: 300 N, 800 N and 1200 N. In these settings, we identified that at 300 N of axial force, no ball was over-stressed. At 800 N and 1200 N, more than one ball is over-stressed.
The FEM analysis was performed also without the anti-rotation device. Fig. 6 depicts the computed force on each ball, for three balls circuits. It can be observed that, also in this case, no ball is over-stressed with 300 N load. In the other load conditions, there are over-stressed balls. However, pressures at 1200 N load were too high and so, after anti-rotation removal, the tests were performed only at 800 N load. Concluding, Monitoring trials were executed at a load of 300 N (nominal H0 condition); Endurance trials were performed with loads of 800 N (over-stressed H1 condition) and 1200 N (over-stressed H1b condition -only before anti-rotation removal).
C. TEST REPORT
The tests were performed from April 2017 to October 2017 (see Table 8 where the number of cycles refers to the number of periods of sinusoidal profiles executed). The traveled distance is computed by taking into account the amplitude of the reference position and an estimate of the position closed-loop transfer function. The estimation of the Frequency Response Function (FRF) has been performed by sine sweeps at 0 N of reference load (Other loads condition). Fig. 7 presents a complete test summary during time. Some dates, when we performed Monitoring trials, are highlighted (in some dates we performed more than one Monitoring trial). The anti-rotation device was removed after an initial test phase, since no evident actuator degradation were observed (visually and from data). Fig. 8 depicts the travelled distance and the screw revolutions (drawn in the plot) considering only tests after anti-rotation removal. The tests performed between 11 and 18 Sept. 2017 were all with normal lubrication. After that, tests were performed by gradually removing lubricant. The dates evidenced in the plot refer to Monitoring trials execution. It is useful to remind that, between a Monitoring trial and another, Endurance trials were executed to stress the actuator. For the algorithm evaluation, Monitoring trials from 18 Sept. 2017 to 12 Oct. 2017 were considered. It is worth noting that, few days after 13 Oct. 2017, the mechanical transmission underwent a mechanical jam, reaching a complete failure.
IV. VISUAL INSPECTION RESULTS
This section describes qualitative evaluations regarding the health state of the balls and the screw threads. After each Monitoring test the ballscrew was disassembled and the balls and the screw threads where visually inspected, in order to verify the real state of degradation of the mechanical transmission. At the end of the test campaign, the screw thread deformation was also measured with a profilometer.
The inspections on balls and screw threads were performed at various stages between September 2017 and October 2017. Fig. 9 depicts pictures of the balls and of the screw shaft at 01 September 2017 and no sign of degradation is visible. Fig. 10 shows the same components during the tests without lubricant. The balls show a strong degradation of their surface, with typical ''hammer-blow'' signs. The screw threads show evident dark scrapes. The reason for this is that the balls, due to the high pressure on them, are no more rolling but they are sliding for the most of their time. The visual inspection data are confirmed by a quantitative measurement of the deformation of the screw thread profile. This was measured by means of a profilometer Mitutoyo CV 3200 H4. The tolerance bands on profiles are of ±0.05 µm. Fig. 11 reports the profile measurement for the third screw thread (the one with higher contact pressures, see Fig. 6 ). The regions where balls, due to the high pressures, delved into the screw are evidenced in the plot by arrows.
Last but not least, it is worth stressing that, during all the tests, the motor correctly performed its function, i.e. the position tracking was correctly performed in all test conditions, notwithstanding the mechanical degradation evidenced by the above described analysis. Fig. 12 reports the Bode plots resulting from this analysis at three different dates: (i) before anti-rotation removal -11 April 2017; (ii) just after anti-rotation removal -15 Sept. 2017, (iii) during no lubricant tests -09 Oct. 2017. The plot shows how the frequency response of the EMA did not change significantly. So, in order to design a Health Monitoring algorithm detecting a degradation in the system, it is necessary to resort to ''internal'' variables, such as the phase currents (the control actions).
V. HEALTH MONITORING ALGORITHM
This section presents an algorithm for continuous Health Monitoring of EMAs. The algorithm is based on Statistical Process Monitoring (SPM) ideas and it provides a set of indicators that have well defined stochastic properties and can be easily used for the health state assessment of the ballscrew/nut assembly.
SPM has the Fault Detection (FD), not Health Monitoring (HM), as its main goal. In this work, we adapt the SPM Fault Detection approach to Health Monitoring needs, by using a wise method for the thresholds assignments and the definition of indicators that can be used (jointly or alone) for a quantitative evaluation of the system health conditions. Moreover, having the time history of the indices it is possible to estimate the Remaining Useful Life (RUL) of the system by extrapolation.
Results of the application of this method to the REPRISE project EMA will be presented in section VI and it is worth noting that the results provided by the algorithm are in strong agreement with the visual inspection results presented in the previous section IV.
First, we review basic notation and results from the process monitoring field [37] , [40] . Let x ∈ R n×1 be a sample vector of n variables. Given m observations, a data matrix X ∈ R m×n can be defined as
From now on, we suppose that data in matrix X have been normalized to zero mean and unit variance, using sample estimates of the mean and variance of each of the n variables. The covariance of x is approximated by the sample covariance matrix
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is used to decompose S as S = P P +P˜ P =Ŝ +S,
whereŜ = P P andS =P˜ P . Here P ∈ R n×l and P ∈ R n×(n−l) contain the principal and residual orthonormal loading vectors, respectively, with l denoting the number of Principal Components (PCs) retained by the model. Diagonal matrices ∈ R l×l and˜ ∈ R (n−l)×(n−l) contain the principal eigenvalues setŜ = {σ i } i=1,··· ,l and the residual eigenvalues setS = {σ i } i=l+1,··· ,n , respectively. The most popular statistical indices used in SPM fault detection are the Squared Prediction Error (SPE) and the Hotelling's T 2 statistics [36] .
A. SQUARED PREDICTION ERROR (SPE) INDEX OR Q STATISTIC
The SPE index, also know as Q statistic, is defined as:
For an assigned confidence level (1 − α) × 100%, the threshold for the SPE index can be computed as
j i , whereσ i ∈S is the i-th eigenvalue of S, and χ 2 α h SPE is the h SPE degrees of freedom Chi-squared distribution deviate, corresponding to the (1 − α) percentile [37] . Further improvements for the SPE bounds can be found in [34] .
B. HOTELLING'S T 2 STATISTICS
The T 2 index is defined as
where D = P −1 P ∈ R n×n is a positive semidefinite matrix computed using P and defined above. A process is said to be in nominal conditions when 1 is a positive threshold value. Here, F α (l, m − l) indicates the deviate corresponding to the (1 − α) percentile of a F-distribution with l and m−l degrees of freedom, see [34] . Notice that both T 2 and τ 2 are strictly greater than zero if m > 1 and x = 0.
C. FAULT DETECTION USING Q AND T 2 STATISTICS
The use of Q and T 2 for Fault Detection consists in a two-step procedure. First of all, a training or set-up phase of the FD algorithm is performed, using data measured in ''nominal'', i.e. no fault, condition (training data). Then, the FD algorithm is ready to be used on new data sets (test data). The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Fault Detection With Q and T 2 Statistics
Input: Training and test data, l, α Output: Presence or absence of a fault
Training or set-up phase: 1 normalize training data to zero mean and unit variance 2 using l, compute the matrices P, and˜ 3 using α, compute the ρ 2 and τ 2 thresholds Test phase: 4 normalize test data using the same mean and variance used in step 1 5 compute the statistics (4) and (5) on the normalized test data using P, and˜ computed in step 2 6 compare each statistic with its threshold: if its value exceed the threshold, then a fault is detected in the process data and an alarm is raised Finally, notice that both these indices depend on tuning parameters. Specifically, both of them depend on the choice of l, i.e. the dimension of the PC subspace and on the confidence level α. Obviously, the smaller is α, the larger will be the thresholds τ 2 and ρ 2 and so it is less likely to have crossings. For instance, as a consequence, the false alarm rate will be decreased. The number of PCs l that are retained is guided by the amount of the variance of the data that is explained. This parameter can be tuned, for instance, on the basis of the S/N ratio in the measurements.
D. SPM FOR HEALTH MONITORING OF AN ELECTRO-MECHANICAL ACTUATOR
We now present the main contribution of the paper, i.e. a general method for Health Monitoring of EMAs. The algorithm can be applied to any electromechanical system to evidence degradation mainly in the mechanical components (e.g. the transmission). The approach is based on the computation of numerical indicators, based on Q and T 2 indices, using the actuator control action, i.e. the motor phase current measurements. This choice is based on the assumption that the system will lose efficiency as degradation worsen and larger control action would be required to perform the same task, even though there is no external evident effect of degradation. In fact, the EMA control system is generally able to compensate for degradation hiding its effects (see Section IV).
The algorithm processes phase current measurements taken during periodic tests along the lifetime of the actuator. For instance, in the case of an airplane actuator, the data can be measured during a preflight test or a periodic maintenance test performed every assigned flight hours number.
The algorithm outline is the following: 1) Denote with i (i) t ∈ R m×1 for i = 1, · · · , p the vectors containing the p phase currents measurements in the t-th experimental periodic test. Here, m indicates the number of sampled data with sampling time T s during the t-th test. The t = 0-th test is the training data set which is reserved to compute the normalization mean and variance and the thresholds τ 2 and ρ 2 , for a given α value. 2) Then, the data matrix X t ∈ R m×(p−1) is constructed as follows, ∀t:
where each variable
The choice of using only p − 1 phase currents is due to the fact that only p − 1 of them are linearly independent, as the phase currents sum to zero at each time instant in BLDC motors. 3) Following the SPM rationale presented in Algorithm 1, the next step is to perform PCA on X t , retaining a number of components l such that a given fraction of the variance of the data is explained. Usually, l is chosen so that 90% of the variance is explained, but a different value can be chosen depending on the S/N ratio in the available measurements. 4) Then, compute the Q t (j), T 2 t (j) values, one for each observation x t (j), which will be used to create the monitoring indicators. The computed values Q t (j) and T 2 t (j) must be compared to the corresponding thresholds ρ 2 and τ 2 , previously computed using the training data set. 5) Each threshold violation define an event e t (j) s.t. for j = 1, . . . , m:
and similarly for the Q statistic. We assume that a lower system health leads to a higher number of threshold violations. 6) The event vector is used to compute four health monitoring indicators. They use the dichotomous (discrete) notion of an event to produce an index that is amenable to a continuous health assessment. (i) Event frequency.
The event frequency indicator λ t is defined as the percentage of observed events N t over the number of data m in an observation time t e with sampling time T s , s.t. m = t e · 1/T s and N t = m j=1 e t (j):
(ii) Mean time to event.
The mean time to event (MTTE) indicator t computes the average time that lasts between any two consecutive events. We call these quantities inter-arrival times. With N t events, there are N t − 1 inter-arrival times. Define with K ⊂ N the ordered set (in increasing order) of indices j s.t. e t (j) = 1. Let the number of observations between event i and event i + 1, with i = 1, . . . , N t − 1, be δ i,t = k i+1 − k i , with k i ∈ K the index when event i occurs. The indicator t is therefore computed as t = sum of inter-arrival times # of inter-arrival times ≡
(iii) Weibull distribution of inter-arrival times rising edges
The Weibull distribution is a vastly employed tool in reliability engineering and survival analysis for modeling random variables that represent times [41] .
In particular, when the modeled variables consist of ''time-to-failure'' data, the Weibull distribution is used to model the failure rate of the components subject to failure and it can be expressed as [41] :
where x ∈ R ≥0 represent time-to-failure data, w(·), W (·) are the probability density function and cumulative density function respectively, β > 0 ∈ R is the shape parameter, η > 0 ∈ R is the scale parameter. Then, the following quantities can be computed:
where h(·) is the hazard function or instant failure rate, and S(·) is the survivor (or survival) function.
The shape parameter β characterises the aging property of the components. In particular, we have [41] :
• Negative aging if β < 1, indicates that the failure rate decreases over time.
• Non-aging if β = 1, indicates that the failure rate is constant over time. It is equal to employ an exponential distribution.
• Positive aging if β > 1, indicates that the failure rate increases with time, which is appropriate for modelling wear-out failure due to gradual deterioration/degradation of an item over time. As the considered component degrades, we expect that:
• The average time-to-failure gets lower, since we expect an impending failure. We call this quantity life expectancy.
• The standard deviation of the times-to-failure gets lower, since we are more confident about the imminent event. We call this quantity life expectancy awareness. These rationales are condensed in the features of the Weibull distribution parameters that can be used to create two Health Monitoring indicators, exploiting the events e t (j) defined above. First of all, define as rising edge the first event e t (j) of a continuous chain of succeeding events (i.e. a successive strike of e t (j) = 1 values). Then, store the times between consecutive rising edges in the variables r t (z) and z = 1, . . . , R t with R t the number of rising edges in experimental test t. Values in r t (z) are the time-tofailure data. Thus, we fit a Weibull distribution via maximum-likelihood to this data. The maximum-likelihood estimates of the Weibull parameters, using the data data r t (z), indicated asη t andβ t , are the last two indicators. Remark. The choice of using only times between rising edges is due to to the fact that we could have long strikes of events for which e t (j) = 1. In this case, most of the data (i.e. number of observations between event i and i+1) are concentrated at the value of δ i,t = 1. This is detrimental for the estimate of a distribution from time-to-failure observation. Using falling edges instead of rising ones yields analogous results. Remark. When the observation time ends before observing the event of interest, we have a so-called right-censored value. In our case, censored data appear only if the events strike last until the end of the experiment. In this case, the last rising edge does not have a corresponding ''next rising edge''. We considered the measured number of observation as a censored data. The fit of the Weibull parameters accounts for this information. 7) Each indicator can be interpreted by looking at:
• relative variations, i.e. changes in its value over time • absolute variations, i.e. comparing its value to an assigned ''warning'' threshold. Considering the last case, it is worth noting that these indicators, thanks to their properties, have ''natural'' thresholds. When the event frequencyλ t is above 50 %, more than half of the data are above threshold. The MTTE t has a natural lower limit that is the sampling time T s . In this case, all the data are above threshold. So, a threshold can be put at 2T s . When the Weibull shape parameterβ t is greater than 1, we have positive aging, that means that the failure rate is increasing with time. The Weibull scale parameterη t depends in a non-trivial way from data. Since it is more complicated to set an absolute value for a threshold, it can be useful to look at relative variations, e.g. when it reaches −50% of its first value. Obviously, the user can use these indicators in different ways according to the application features.
As a consequence, different use strategies of the indicators are possible. For instance, a warning can be raised only when all the indicators crossed their own threshold or, when only one among them crossed its own, or a majority of them did. Also, a subset of indicators can be computed, for instance only those based on the T 2 , like in the application case of this paper, or based on a combination of T 2 and SPE [37] . Notice that the indicators 1 and 3 in (8) and (9) are very simple to compute, while accurate estimation of the Weibull parameters requires an optimization process. Furthermore, indicator 1 in (8) and indicator 3 in (9) represents very similar information: from a practitioner point of view, it is possible to implement just one of them. These choices depend on the application field and the safety requirements.
The proposed HM approach is summarized in Algorithm 2, for a specific test t.
VI. APPLICATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section shows the results obtained by applying the procedure described in Section V to the datasets acquired during the Monitoring trials highlighted in Fig. 8 , using the REPRISE three phase EMA described in section III.
Furthermore, a comparison with a different rationale from [42] , based on a change detection algorithm that also relies on the motor phase currents, is provided.
A. PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed indicators are computed using Monitoring trials data, from Sept. 21, 2017 to Oct. 12, 2017, see Fig. 8 . In this dates range, there are T = 9 datasets. The dataset of Sept. 18, 2017, i.e. the last dataset in healthy condition, is used as the t = 0 dataset (the training dataset), in order to tune the alarm thresholds and to compute the normalization mean and variance. The confidence interval is α = 0.05. For each of the 9 datasets, one value of four indicators is computed, using the T 2 index. Therefore, we have 9 values for each indicator.
The current measurements were downsampled by a factor of 4 to speed up the computations. So, the new sampling time of the data is therefore T s = 1200 Hz. This operation does not affect the dynamics of the phase currents. The data consist of tests at 0 mm offset and 10 mm amplitude. This choice approximates the motor usage described in Table 6 : (i) the actuator usually starts from the 0 mm offset position; (ii) the 10 mm of amplitude span most of the useful stroke of the actuator. This is also the condition that could be easily used in a periodic preflight or maintenance test. The dataset were measured with position closed loop control using sinusoidal reference trajectories at different frequency values, as specified in section III-B. Each experiment was 90 s long and the first 10 s were discarded to remove transients and initial conditions effects.
The data matrix X t of the t-th Monitoring trial is computed using two out of three phase currents i
t for t = 1, . . . , 9. So, the data matrix X t ∈ R m×2 is, ∀t:
In particular, the vectors i
t in (12) are defined as follows. Let F = f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n f be a set of n f frequencies.
f ,t ∈ R m×1 the vectors containing the phase currents measurements in the t-th Monitoring trial, at a 
The set of considered frequencies in (13) is (in Hertz) F = {0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. This is a subset of n f = 5 frequencies from the 10 frequencies used to perform Endurance and Monitoring trials, see Section III-B. The choice of the frequencies in F is motivated by the requirements described in Section II-C. In this specific case, the data matrix has two columns that are linearly independent, so the SPE index cannot be computed and only the T 2 index is used. Here, using a 90% threshold of explained variance in PCA ensures that, if one of the two phase currents signals is faulty (e.g. due to a broken sensor), the method will discard the noise component and maintains the signal component.
The computed indicators are depicted in Fig. 13 and Fig. 14. All the indicators show a fast evolving trend starting when the lubricant has been reduced and then eliminated. Also, a quite monotonic behaviour has been obtained, in line with the progressive degradation of the actuator.
The Event frequency indicator λ t shows an exponential increase of the percentage of events with actuator degradation. A warning threshold can be set when a certain chosen percentage level is reached. In Fig. 13 the 50% threshold is evidenced. Remember that, in the case of complete failure of the actuator, this indicator will reach the value of 100%. However, in the experimental tests performed, no failure happened and at the end of the tests the system closed loop position control was providing good performance (see section IV).
The MTTE indicator t shows a decreasing behaviour of the mean time between events, as expected. Since the pre-processed data have a sampling time of about T s ≈ 8 · 10 −4 s, by the end of the tests, approximately 1 every 10 measurements generates an event. Again, a threshold can be set to raise a warning when the mean time to event gets too low. In case of complete failure, the MTTE will be equal to T s .
The Weibull shape parameter indicatorβ t and Weibull scale parameter indicatorη t are depicted with the 95% confidence intervals on the parameters estimates. The indexη t is reported as percentage change with respect to the valuê η 1 . As the motor degrades, more rising edges are present. Therefore, the estimates are more certain and confidence intervals get narrower. A warning level forβ t can be automatically computed noting that, whenβ t > 1 (i.e. the failure rate increases with time), it is possible to say that the actuator is starting to degrade. Fig. 14 shows how this value is approached by the test of 06 Oct. 2017 and exceeded by the test of 11 Oct. 2017, accordingly with the other indicators. Indicatorη t depends in a non-trivial way from data, so it is more complicated to set a threshold. However, one can raise an alarm when its value is, for example, less than 50% of its first valueη 1 = 0.044, resulting in a threshold of 0.022. Again, this is true for the test of 11 Oct. 2017.
The behaviour ofη t andβ t can be better understood by computing the mean value and standard deviation of the resulting Weibull distributions (one for each test). Fig. 15 depicts the empirical and estimated cumulative density functions W (x|β t , η t ), see (10b). It can be seen how the mean value (life expectancy) and the standard deviation (life expectancy awareness) of the estimated models decrease with degradation. This means that the times between rising edges are getting shorter and shorter, and there is less and less uncertainty about their value.
Remark: The proposed rationale implicitly assumes that test conditions are equal to those used for setting the τ 2 threshold. In fact, one can imagine that phase currents varies with a different load than the nominal one used when setting τ 2 . For this reason, the proposed approach can be used when the aircraft is on ground, for example during a preflight test, when load conditions are supposed to be the same. 
B. COMPARISON WITH A METHOD BASED ON CHANGE DETECTION
In this section, we compare the proposed approach with the one outlined in [42] - [44] , based on a change detection method. We choose this method for a comparison because: (i) it is a data-driven batch approach, although based on the evaluation of completely different statistical indicators; (ii) it makes use of the motor phase currents for monitoring, as the proposed methodology. Here the aim is to look for statistical changes in the distribution of the data, from one experiment to another. In this sense, the method in [42] works in a batch fashion, as the one proposed in this work. The rationale is to estimate theα-relative Pearson divergence [42] between the distributions of the data sets from the two experiments that are compared, withα ∈ R an hyperparameter of the method. The output is an indication of ''dissimilarity'' of the two experiments. The divergence is computed by estimating the ratio of the two data distributions (one for each test) through a parametric linear combination of Gaussian densities.
The data considered in [42] are the Root Mean Square (RMS) and Crest Factor (CF) features computed from the same phase currents signals of the BLDC motor considered in this work. Given a test with sinusoidal input profile and a fixed frequency of movement, these two features are computed with the three phase currents data for each period of the sinusoidal input. So, we have that each test is represented by a feature matrix Z t ∈ R 2×100 , i.e. two features and 100 input sinusoidal periods (cycles), see Table 7 .
The rationale for computing the health monitoring indicator is as follows [42] . First, in the set-up phase, compute the divergence π 0 between two healthy tests. We consider as the t = 0 test the experiment on 11 Sept. 2017, and as t = 1 test the experiment on 18 Sept. 2017, see Fig. 8 . Then, set a threshold ξ as two-times π 1 . The subsequent tests are then compared with the last experiment t = t * that exceeded the threshold ξ . Each time ξ is violated, a damage counter ζ is incremented. The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3 and the results are reported in Fig. 16 for a fixed frequency of 1 Hz, a 300 N load and a 10 mm stroke as in [42] .
Algorithm 3 Health Monitoring With Change Detection
Input: Z t * , Z t , hyperparameters vector ψ Output: t-th value of the damage indicator ζ Training or set-up phase (for t ≤ 1): 1 compute the divergence π 1 between Z 0 and Z 1 2 set a threshold ξ ← 2 · π 1 Test phase (for t > 1): 3 ζ ← 0; t * ← 1 4 compute the divergence π t between Z t * and Z t if π t > ξ then t * ← t; ζ ← ζ + 1 end
C. DISCUSSION
As can be seen in Figures 13, 14 and 16, both approach are able to assess the motor degradation before the end of the motor life. In this regard, the proposed indicators admits a more intuitive threshold definition, upon which its crossing denotes an ''alarm'' condition. In the method of [42] , the damage score ζ monotonically increases but it is difficult to define a proper threshold to trigger and alarm.
The proposed approach needs the definition of only two parameters: (i) the confidence level α and the number of principal components l (or a percentage of explained variance). The method of [42] requires the tuning of three hyperparameters: (i) theα term; (ii) a regularization term µ and (iii) the standard deviation of the Gaussian components ι. While, in principle, both sets of hyperparameters could be tuned by some cross-validation procedure, in the proposed approach their tuning is less critical and more interpretable.
Furthermore, for the specific applicative case considered, the proposed approach is able to take into consideration more frequencies of motion (remember that the reference position is sinusoidal), while the method in [42] is constrained to consider only a single input frequency.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A. CONCLUDING REMARKS This paper presented the results of the REPRISE project in developing a Health Monitoring approach for Electro-Mechanical Actuators. An extended experimental activity has been carried out on a 1:1 scale EMA, by means of a test rig specifically designed for this project. Dynamic, load and operating conditions were defined on the basis of the flight actuator requirements and reliability analysis. Wear was induced in the EMA transmission by lubricant gradual removal. Since the actuators are usually closed-loop controlled, the monitoring approach is based on the analysis of the control actions, i.e. the motor phase currents. Relying on methods borrowed from the statistical process control literature, that generally give a dichotomous output, we defined a set of monitoring indicators suited to assess continuously the overall health state of the actuator. We tested the proposed general approach on an EMA employed for the actuation of primary flight control surfaces in small aircrafts. Although the proposed approach rely on the assumption that the external conditions (load, disturbances) remain the same during all the test sessions, it can be effectively employed as a preflight test procedure or a periodic maintenance operation.
B. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The method envisioned in this paper is a knowledge-based one, i.e. it relies on a batch of previously acquired data to set the value of statistic thresholds. As already mentioned, the assumption about stationarity of the external conditions has to be made for this approaches to remain valid through different times and experiments. A model-based approach, if feasible, would permit to decouple disturbances and noise from actual inputs, being therefore robust against external variations. However, a proper model-based scheme requires specific conditions on the number of measured inputs/outputs with respect to the number of faults/disturbances to be managed, see [45] , that are not always satisfied. Obviously, a model of the system has to be developed, with its difficulties such as non-linearities and time-varying behaviours. A Model-based approach is therefore a sought next direction to be investigated, that could bring noticeably improvements. Further work is also envisioned in order to test the repeatability of the results shown in this paper.
